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A B S T R A C T   
In this paper, in-situ radiological characterisation by means of non-destructive techniques is studied and analysed 
in the context of the different constrained environments (identified as radioactivity, materials, accessibility and 
other hazards) that may be encountered in the nuclear facilities undergoing decommissioning and dismantling. 
As a complement to a previous paper (Aspe et al., 2020), the present one gives a global guidance to assist with the 
decision making process regarding the selection of in-situ measurement techniques that could be applied in such 
constrained environments. 
In addition, from the definition of the investigation objectives, and for each one of the most common in-situ 
measurement techniques, a brief description is given about the impact of the above constraints and how to 
integrate them onto the system definition, including the experimental design, the mechanical integration and the 
data management, to properly define the best radiological characterization methodology. 
Moreover, complementing this general view, all the phases – from initial to final – of a D&D programme were 
taken into account to provide basic recommendations, together with some particular dispositions, for the 
appropriate implementation of the chosen instruments. 
Strengths and weaknesses of the common detectors used for the different in-situ measurement techniques, as 
well as their recommended applications in nuclear facilities are also outlined.   
1. Introduction 
Decommissioning and dismantling (D&D) of nuclear facilities 
(power reactors, fuel cycle plants, research or medical accelerators, 
etc.), until their remediation and clearance, is a global international 
industrial challenge for the XXIth century. The strategy to be followed is 
specific to each country depending, amongst other considerations, upon 
the facility’s characteristics, own regulatory policies, environmental 
protection and radioactive waste management (Laraia and Laraia, 
2012). However, any D&D programme will result in a volume of waste 
materials that should be classified as radioactive or not. 
Usually, after a first stage of historical collection and functional data, 
radiological inventory is established and consolidated with preliminary 
in-situ measurements, by means of non-destructive assay (NDA) tech-
niques (Amgarou and Herranz, 2021). Undoubtedly, this constitutes a 
complex issue considering the wide variety of structures and equipment 
involved, so that their proper radiological characterization becomes a 
necessary prerequisite for a successful quantification of the different 
contaminated materials (IAEA, 1998). Such a radiological character-
ization is also needed during the dismantling activities to evaluate the 
efficacy of the applied decontamination procedures and to certify the 
final quality of the produced waste drums. Of course, in-situ NDA 
measurements do not always provide sufficiently complete radiological 
data and, in most cases, they should be complemented with laboratory 
analysis of representative samples. 
However, the vast majority of nuclear facilities under D&D offer 
many constrained environments, due to their limited accessibility, the 
presence of high radiation levels, or even the extreme ambient condi-
tions of the room where in-situ measurements are to be carried out. 
Classification and categorization of all these possible constrained 
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environments has been already done in a previous paper (Aspe et al., 
2020); whereas in this one, the ability of the existing equipment to be 
used in each one of them is analysed. 
It is explained in Aspe et al. (2020) that for each facility subject to a 
D&D programme, the investigation objectives of the radiological char-
acterization and, hence, of in-situ measurements, are given by proj-
ect/authorities. Moreover, the description and historical information of 
the site are necessary for complementing the defined investigation ob-
jectives to accomplish the decision process (NEA, 2013). 
Based on this preliminary information and the analysis of the pre-
vailing environmental constraints, it is possible to determine the exact 
locations for the necessary in-situ measurements, as well as the most 
suitable equipment and methodologies to be used. This process is named 
“system definition”. At the same time, it is essential to carry out an 
analysis of the resources, quality, safety and security issues. Such a 
process, which is known as “intervention definition”, although it can 
condition the final decision about the in-situ measurement technologies, 
is outside the focus of this paper. 
In this context, the present paper gives a global guidance to assist 
with the decision making process regarding the selection of the best in- 
situ measurement techniques that could be applied in constrained en-
vironments. For the sake of simplicity, these constrained environments 
are hereafter referred to as “constraints” and they are identified as 
radioactivity, materials, accessibility, and other hazards (Aspe et al., 
2020). They may individually affect each in-situ measurement tech-
nique to be used and also the interpretation of the results obtained. 
Some latest cutting-edge technologies, like laser induced breakdown 
spectroscopy or LIBS (Radziemski and Cremers, 2006) and muon to-
mography (Jonkmans et al., 2013) are not discussed here as, at least up 
till now, they have only been developed by a few research laboratories 
and they are not commonly used in the nuclear industry. 
Fig. 1 shows a simplified flow diagram illustrating the key practices 
and arrangements that we have considered for the deployment of 
appropriate in-situ measurement techniques in constrained environ-
ments. All the recommendations given in the present document should 
not be interpreted as absolute or strict requirements. The reader needs to 
remember that these recommendations should not be taken literally 
when applied to their own specific case studies. 
In what follows, basic recommendations are initially provided for the 
choice of in-situ measurement techniques for each phase during the 
whole D&D programme. 
Afterwards, regarding the proposed in-situ measurement techniques, 
the incidence on their overall performance of the different constrained 
environments is highlighted together with an explanation of the three 
Fig. 1. Simplified flow diagram illustrating the minimum arrangements for the deployment of appropriate in-situ measurement techniques for each constrained 
environment. 
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design principles of system engineering that must be envisaged to 
integrate these constraints on the definition of the investigation 
methodology. 
Finally, some particular dispositions are formulated for the appro-
priate implementation of the chosen instruments, as well as further 
technical issues which the investigation methodology has to consider, in 
regard to every nuclear facility room or area where each of the major 
constraints have been identified. 
2. Role of in-situ measurements in a D&D programme 
In-situ measurements together with laboratory analysis of repre-
sentative samples are of vital importance throughout the different 
phases of a D&D programme. It must be noted that, for a specific area, 
the existing constraints (Aspe et al., 2020) could change during the 
progress of these phases and then, the methodologies to be used for the 
corresponding in-situ characterization would have to be adapted 
accordingly. For example, most of the irradiation constraints are nor-
mally present at the beginning and should decrease during the remedi-
ation phase until they have almost disappeared by the end. 
2.1. Initial – dismantling phase 
One of the main objectives in the initial phase of any D&D pro-
gramme is the estimation of the fissile mass quantity and/or the radio-
active level of existing waste. For this purpose, in-situ radiation 
measurements, especially dose rate and total gamma strengthened with 
some gamma-ray spectrometry or neutron assay, are needed. Table 1 
outlines the different studies carried out during this phase as well as 
their associated investigation objectives and recommended NDA 
techniques. 
2.2. Intermediate - remediation phase 
If consideration of the primary characterization leads to a decision to 
undertake remediation, the intermediate phase of the ongoing D&D 
programme must start immediately. During this phase, a more detailed 
characterization would be necessary to facilitate decisions to be made 
about the appropriate intervention means, and then on further details or 
steps of that action. At this stage, some in-situ measurements, like dose 
rate and total gamma, are needed to allow the full engineering design of 
the remediation phase. Table 2 resumes the recommended in-situ 
measurement techniques for each types of radioactivity during the in-
termediate or remediation phase of a D&D programme. 
2.3. Final – release phase 
The final D&D phase occurs only after the completion of all 
remediation activities and the justification for reaching the end state 
targeted by the operator. This means that both the considered site and its 
near environment are fully cleaned up to a predetermined endpoint 
(unrestricted release or further reuse), from any dangerous and radio-
active substance. Therefore, the final objective regarding radiological 
characterization must be the evaluation of the possible presence of re-
sidual radioactivity in the remaining areas and ancillary buildings as 
well as underground contamination. The ultimate aim of this objective is 
to obtain the lifting of the regulatory controls to which a basic nuclear 
installation is subjected to. Often, at this stage, the number of in-situ 
measurements (as recommended in Table 2) strongly decreases and 
the major part of the characterization is focused on the in-lab analysis, 
which provide the lowest detection limits and the best efficiency. 
3. Integrating constraints on the system definition 
3.1. Impact of environmental constraints 
Once the existing impacts are defined for a specific room, they should 
be integrated in the system definition process. Table 3 gives a broad 
indication on the incidence of the major environmental constraints on 
the existing measurement equipment based on experience gained and 
lessons learnt from past D&D activities. The different levels of all po-
tential incidences are classified as follows:  
• NA when it is just not applicable  
• 3 for high incidence  
• 2 for intermediate incidence  
• 1 for low incidence  
• 0 for no or unknown incidence 
Section 4 formulates some recommendations that need to be taken 
into account for the appropriate choice of the instruments, as well as 
further technical issues the investigation methodology has to consider, 
in regard to every nuclear facility area where each of the major con-
straints have been identified. Although there might be the possible 
presence of other hazards, like chemical and/or biological ones which 
basically only affect the human intervention scenarios, some recom-
mendations regarding this subject are also given in this section. 
3.2. Conception methodology 
Though independently organized, the three design principles of 
system engineering as illustrated in Fig. 2 are to be integrated into a 
global design process of in-situ measurements. Of all the existing pos-
sibilities, only those that meet the identified field needs and re-
quirements should be chosen. 
3.2.1. Experimental design 
Experimental design is firstly based on the characterization 
Table 1 
Different studies carried out during the initial phase of a D&D programme as 
well as their associated investigation objectives and recommended in-situ NDA 
techniques.  
Needs Objective of the 
investigation 
Recommended in-situ NDA 
technique 
Safety studies Criticality control Gamma-ray spectrometry 
Neutron measurements 
Waste studies Verification of 
radiological spectrum 














Localization of nuclear 
material 
Radiation cameras  
Table 2 
Recommended in-situ NDA techniques for each type of radioactivity during both 
the intermediate and final phases of a D&D programme.  
Type of radioactivity Recommended in-situ NDA 
technique 
Non contaminated surface None 




Contaminated surface by “liquid” contamination 






Contaminated surface by “liquid” contamination 
with deep structural penetration  
Activated inner walls Gamma-ray spectrometry  
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objectives. Such an important step must be formalized as follows (in 
order of priority):  
• The choice of the detector with the best characteristics depending 
mainly on the properties of the measured object, such as its shape, 
volume, weight or mass density, material composition, as well as the 
inner spatial distributions of the radioactive source.  
• The choice of the measurement configuration that takes into account 
the characterization objectives, the desired statistical precision, the 
available space, etc.  
• Potential installation of radiation attenuation screens. This kind of 
set-up is being reserved for cases where the application of the above 
choices do not offer satisfactory results. 
All these technical choices essentially depend on the different con-
strained environments, without forgetting the required particular dis-
positions that have to be integrated on a case-by-case basis (see Section 
4). 
3.2.2. Mechanical integration 
Mechanical integration in the case of in-situ measurements consists 
of:  
• The choice of the carrier platform (robot, drone, articulated arm, 
special machine, etc.) according to the previously established needs 
and requirements: entire autonomous system, remotely controlled 
(either wired or wireless), measurement by the operator in the field.  
• The definition of the mechanical integration of the whole system 
according to the design constraints related to the choice of the ra-
diation detector, its associated electronics and any other component 
or device, if necessary, as well as their handling, packing, trans-
portation and on-site deployment of the whole system. 
Some of these technical choices also depend on the different con-
strained environments. Several other factors related to the system reli-
ability, availability, maintainability and safety must also be taken into 
account. In practice, reliability depends on both the system complexity 
and the working environment, so that attempts should be made to have 
proper combination of components, avoiding or reinforcing the critical 
ones, in order to reduce, to the strictest minimum, the overall frequency 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 2. Design principles of system engineering applied for in-situ 
measurements. 
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3.2.3. Data management 
The term “data management” includes secure communication with 
all the deployed devices and sensors together with data gathering, 
transfer, processing and storage. 
In no case should data management neglect the correct choice of the 
interpretation method and the quality of the measurements. This means 
that it has to constantly contemplate the following aspects: 
• The definition of the interpretation methodology, which is intrinsi-
cally linked to the system design of the device and it must be 
considered as a key step in the success of in-situ measurements. Such 
an interpretation is most often based on assumptions and good 
practices taken by considering the history of the item to be 
characterized.  
• The strategic approach to reduce and evaluate uncertainties. Above 
all, their identification at the initial stage makes it possible to 
formalize all the assumptions regarding the system design and to 
integrate them numerically into the final results. 
On-site deployment in the majority of nuclear facilities requires fast 
and reliable indoor wireless bidirectional networks. Advantages of a Li- 
Fi connection (Dimitrov and Haas, 2015) in enclosed spaces with respect 
to the Wi-Fi one are: a wide bandwidth (from infrared to ultraviolet); it 
can operate in electromagnetic sensitive areas (not even the cause of 
such interferences); it is almost hundred times faster; and in principle 
with no limits of capacity. 
4. Particular dispositions 
4.1. Environmental radiation measurements 
This section is mainly focused on environmental measurements of 
the X/γ radiation. Such measurements may include gross counting, air- 
kerma or H*(10) monitoring. Although H*(10) measurements may also 
be performed for neutrons in some circumstances, all the constraints 
influencing this kind of measurement are discussed separately in Section 
4.4 together with those associated to the neutron coincidence counting 
mode. 
Table 4 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the common 
detectors used for environmental radiation measurements as well as 
their recommended applications in nuclear facilities subject to a D&D 
programme. 
4.1.1. Radioactivity constraints 
4.1.1.1. Radiation 
4.1.1.1.1. Identification of constraints. A measurement in high dose 
rate environments is very challenging when using gas-filled detectors 
and can be affected in several ways, such as signal discrimination, 
detection performance, dead (or resolving) time issues and background 
correction. 
In situations of elevated count rates, problems of the loss of linearity 
followed by a complete saturation or paralysis (i.e., the filling gas re-
mains permanently ionized) of the detector used could occur, requiring 
very careful choice of its intrinsic or setting parameters (i.e., operating 
voltage, temperature and gas pressure) and its associated electronics 
(Usman and Patil, 2018). 
In addition, exposure to extremely high flux of neutrons, charged 
particles and very energetic photons (i.e. above 10 MeV) may seriously 
damage electronic components or compromise their characteristics, thus 
leading to a drastic decrease in the detector lifetime. In such irradiation 
circumstances, organic insulators may also break down. 
4.1.1.1.2. Integration of constraints on the instrument design. In 
principle, very compact gas-filled detectors can be used to challenge 
high radiation dose rates, but those based on silicon PIN diodes also 
constitute a good alternative. This is particularly important for back-
ground level studies and real-time reporting of any abrupt elevation in 
this level to the first responders. Fast response, low operating voltage, 
low power consumption, portability, compactness and practically un-
limited operating life make them better adapted in such circumstances. 
For example, the employment of energy-compensated Si-based detectors 
provides a more or less flat response over a wide photon energy range 
(60–1250 keV) and can tolerate radiation dose rates going beyond 20 
Gy/h (Mitra et al., 2016). 
4.1.1.1.3. Integration of constraints on the final mechanical design. It 
may be necessary to implement shielding and collimation mechanisms 
with small opening angles in order to restrict the field-of-view of the 
chosen instruments, preferably of very reduced-size, to only specific 
areas or portions of the item to be measured. The acquisition can 
therefore be performed at different positions around the object 
providing a high degree of precision. The extra possibility, in the case of 
ionization chambers and proportional counters, of only considering low 
inner gas pressure must also be envisaged. 
Furthermore, the complementary deployment of a remotely mobile 
platform, such as a robot or drone, with increased radiation tolerance of 
both its mechanical and electronic components, is also a good alterna-
tive (Tsitsimpelis et al., 2019). 
4.1.1.2. Contamination. Most of the available detectors for environ-
mental radiation measurements, except perhaps those having a thin end- 
window, are adequately protected against the potential presence of 
airborne radionuclides and their outer surfaces effectively facilitate 
their proper cleaning after each use. Sometimes their additional pro-
tection within plastic bags can be counterproductive as it may either 
block their internal heat exhaust or produce more attenuation phe-
nomenon, especially for β-particles and low-energy X/γ radiation. 
4.1.2. Materials constraints 
4.1.2.1. Air. Air-kerma measurements are not trivial and several 
correction factors must always be considered, namely the ones associ-
ated to the possible variations with respect to the air pressure and 
temperature under which the detector calibration was carried out. 
In addition, big changes regarding the air density has a non- 
negligible impact on the overall performance of the other detectors 
thus leading to large uncertainties and data misinterpretation, mainly 
when measuring weakly penetrating radiation. 
It should also be borne in mind that insulation of conventional cables 
and BNC connectors as well as most of the electronic components tend to 
fail at critical temperatures. For example, when they are left near 
heating elements, sun-warmed surfaces, radiators and large cooling 
machines. Alternatively, a temperature compensation system can also be 
implemented on detectors and their associated electronics. 
4.1.2.2. Liquid. According to Radiation Protection rules, there is no 
need or interest to perform environmental measurements under liquid 
immersion conditions as both H*(10) and air-kerma operational quan-
tities for external exposures to ionizing radiation are defined and cali-
brated considering only a free-in-air geometry configuration. 
In addition, considering what has been said in the previous Section, 
another correction factor must be applied when measuring air-kerma in 
very humid atmospheres. 
Spurious pulses of about the same size as those from the real signal 
can sometimes appear and are due to fluctuations in leakage currents 
through insulators, particularly under high humidity environments 
(Knoll, 2010). 
4.1.2.3. Consistency. In general, in-situ measurements of bulky radio-
active materials are seriously affected by uncertainties on the charac-
teristics of the detector used, on the properties of the measured object, as 
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already stated in Section 3.2.1, and on the considered geometric 
configuration of the whole scene under study. Therefore, they need a 
series of theoretical simulations in a way to calculate ad hoc transfer 
functions and to correctly evaluate all the uncertainties that have a 
wider influence on the final results. 
However, as nuclear facilities contain huge structures and complex 
equipment, producing accurate models becomes extremely difficult 
because in most circumstances such detailed information is missing. In 
that case, several hypothesis, as realistic as possible, must be considered, 
taking into account the available historical knowledge (even when 
incomplete) and their plausibility has to be checked by comparing the 
associated results obtained from at least two different in-situ measure-
ment techniques each time. 
4.1.3. Accessibility constraints 
4.1.3.1. Narrow or clutter spaces. The possible deployment of a 
remotely mobile platform, based on reduced-size detectors and 
equipped with the necessary sensors (position, motion, inclination, 
proximity), would allow access to those spaces with very limited 
accessibility (Tsitsimpelis et al., 2019). 
As an example of best practice in this domain, given the need to 
ensure a frequent battery recharging of such a mobile platform oper-
ating in difficult access areas, Ishida and Furukawa (2015) developed a 
method for transmitting electrical power through thick concrete walls, 
based on magnetic resonance coupling, without the need neither for 
laboriously drilling holes in them nor for eventual routing of cables 
(often over long distance corridors) from one side to another. 
In line with this, a self-powered wireless system for ultrasonic data 
transmission has recently been designed (Wu et al., 2019) to be applied 
under very harsh environments in almost all the enclosed structures of 
nuclear facilities. To successfully address these kind of problematic as-
pects, it may be helpful to consult the review carried out by Yang et al. 
(2015) about the current viable technologies to power and communicate 
with hidden sensors behind metallic barriers. 
Table 4 
Strengths and weaknesses of the common detectors used for environmental radiation measurements as well as their recommended applications in nuclear facilities 
subject to a D&D programme.  
DETECTOR TYPE STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES WHERE TO APPLY 
Ionization chambers •can be made to have a very good X/γ 
energy and polar response as also 
acceptable β characteristics 
•no problems with pulsed fields 
•good dynamic range of dose rates, 
typically 2 μSv h− 1 up to 10 Sv/h 
•can use small polarising batteries 
•very low signal level at normal radiation protection 
dose rates leading to statistical fluctuations or slow 
response times 
•generally unusable below 2 μSv h− 1 
•susceptible to temperature and humidity corrections 
•requires careful use and good maintenance, 
particularly regular drying of desiccant 
•expensive 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 
except the ones under liquid immersion conditions 
Proportional counters •good X/γ energy response down to 30 keV 
•useful beta response at higher energies 
•generally satisfactory with pulsed fields 
•high detection efficiency 
•wide dynamic range of useable dose rates 
by varying the gas amplification or the 
polarizing voltage 
•relatively vulnerable detector, for the β versions 
•uses a very high polarising voltage 
•expensive 
•susceptible to high voltage variation 
•pulse pile-up effect at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 
except the ones under liquid immersion conditions 




•very easy to process signal 
•with a more or less (±30%) flat energy 
response in terms of H*(10) 
•much more sensitive than an ionization 
chamber, a volume of 10 cm3 has the same 
detection efficiency as an ionization 
chamber of 300 cm3 




•no useful β response 
•X/γ response that falls rapidly below ~50 keV 
•seriously affected by pulsed fields, untrustworthy 
when the count rates exceed about 35% of the pulse 
rate from a machine producing narrow (μs) pulses 
•dead time effect at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 






•very good X/γ energy response from 10 or 
15 keV upwards to 1.25 MeV 
•good polar response 
•instruments where the filter can be removed so that 
the detector can be used as a conventional end- 
window detector are susceptible to physical damages 
•dead time effect at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 
except the ones with high dose rates or under 
liquid immersion conditions. Pay special attention 
to corrosive chemical compounds that can easily 
affect detector windows. 
Thin end-window GM 
detectors 
•respond to X/γ radiations from 5 keV 
upwards and to all β radiation which 
contributes to ambient or directional dose 
equivalent rate 
•good polar response (“pancake” types) 
•very vulnerable when used with the end-window 
unprotected, i.e. to measure β-particles and/or very 
low energy X/γ radiation, subsequent physical 
damage is generally fatal and cannot be repaired 
•must be protected with a fine etched metal or plastic 
grill 
•poor energy-response 
•dead time effect at intense radiation fields 
•very thin detector windows can easily be affected by 
corrosive chemical compounds 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 
except the ones with high dose rates or under 
liquid immersion conditions 
Plastic scintillation 
detectors 
•good X/γ energy and polar response down 
to 20 keV for instruments with smaller 
scintillators and thin cans 
•high detection efficiency 
•background rejection 
•good dynamic range by varying the 
polarizing voltage 
•easy to produce a logarithmic dose rate 
response 
•large detector (scintillator and photomultiplier tube) 
•expensive 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as intrinsic defects and/or 
failures at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 
except the ones under liquid immersion conditions  
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4.1.3.2. Height. Access to great heights may need the use of drones, lift 
gears, telescopic tubes or extension arms. One important aspect to 
highlight is that the additional use of the shields and collimators, if 
needed, will add too many complications due to their weight and size. 
4.1.3.3. Subsurface. Environmental measurements throughout deeply 
contaminated areas or soils may be very suitable initially to have an idea 
about the potential presence of radioactive singularities or hotspots, and 
can be roughly correlated with the activities of the major gamma-ray 
emitting radionuclides. 
4.1.4. Other hazards 
The deployment of an unmanned mobile platform can also be of 
great utility to correctly control the air quality as well as to detect the 
presence of toxic, flammable or combustible atmospheres and other 
dangerous agents in remote areas, thus avoiding any unnecessary risk of 
human exposure. 
The presence of corrosive chemicals may also affect the performance 
of the radiation detectors and extreme attention must be paid to the ones 
hermetically sealed with plastic materials or using a thin end-window, in 
order to measure weakly penetrating radiation. 
4.2. Surface contamination measurements 
The following tables (Tables 5 - 7) summarize the strengths and 
weaknesses of the common detectors used for surface contamination 
measurements as well as their recommended applications in nuclear 
facilities subject to a D&D programme. 
4.2.1. Radioactivity constraints 
4.2.1.1. Radiation. Proportional counters, which can be used to control 
the radioactive contamination on surfaces, offer the possibility to 
distinguish the alpha-induced pulses from the beta ones by simply 
adjusting the bias voltage. In fact, pulse pile-up effect due to high levels 
of radiation can alter peak amplitudes and reduce the effectiveness of 
the crosstalk or spill over corrections that account for the discrimination 
of signals and their correct assignment. All these signal discrimination 
problems may lead to problems related to the efficiency calibration 
(Knoll, 2010). 
In those areas with extreme levels of radiation, surface contamina-
tion can hardly be evaluated by direct methods. The only way in this 
case would be by taking smear samples from each suspected contami-
nated area, by means of a remotely robot preferably under wireless 
mode, and measuring, once recovered back in a safe room, its associated 
removable contamination with the appropriate instruments as listed in 
the above tables. Nevertheless, the use of drones in such circumstances 
has to be strictly forbidden since their propellers are able to re-suspend 
contaminating particles in the air and the extent of surface contamina-
tion to other areas or objects, which were originally clean enough to be 
Table 5 
Strengths and weaknesses of the common detectors used for surface contamination measurements, in the case of α-particles, as well as their recommended applications 
in nuclear facilities subject to a D&D programme.  
DETECTOR TYPE STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES WHERE TO APPLY 
Solid state detectors •very good detection efficiency 
•ultra lightweight and compact 
•extremely susceptible to electromagnetic 
interference 
•tend to be microphonic 
•expensive 
•fragile 
•can be sensitive to β, γ and neutrons 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as intrinsic defects 
and/or failures at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 
except the ones with electromagnetic 
interference or under liquid immersion 
conditions 
•considering only smooth and impermeable 
surfaces 
ZnS scintillation detectors •good detection efficiency, the majority of 
α-particles that penetrate the window with 
significant energy will be counted 
•available in a wide range of sizes 
•reasonable β, X and γ rejection although 
ultimately either false counts will be recorded at 
high dose rates or the detector will fail to 
danger 
•lightweight, most of them use separate probes 
•low intrinsic background 
•easy setting up procedure 
•extremely vulnerable, unlike the scintillator 
and photomultiplier combination, the delicate 
and expensive part is just behind the window 
•can be sensitive to β, γ and neutrons 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as intrinsic defects 
and/or failures at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 
except the ones under liquid immersion 
conditions 




(ZnS on plastic 
scintillator) 
•good detection efficiency, as for standard α 
pulses 
•useful for mixed α and high to intermediate 
energy β contamination 
•lightweight 
•easy window repair 
•may not tolerate high magnetic fields, unless 
using a proper Mu-metal shielding 
•can be sensitive to β, γ and neutrons 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as intrinsic defects 
and/or failures at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 
except the ones with high magnetic fields or 
under liquid immersion conditions 
•considering only smooth and impermeable 
surfaces 
Thin end-window GM 
detectors 
•large, easily processed pulse 
•very simple setting up procedure 
•consistent operating voltage and radiation 
characteristics 
•lowest cost overall option in most 
circumstances 
•light and compact 
•small “pancake” GMs are reasonably cheap 
•extremely fragile 
•background count-rates generally too high 
•no discrimination against other radiations 
•dead time effect at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 
except the ones with high rates or under liquid 
immersion conditions 
•considering only smooth and impermeable 
surfaces without corrosive chemical compounds 
Thin end-window gas- 
filled proportional 
counters 
•very good detection efficiency. 
•virtually any α particle passing through the 
window with an energy in excess of 0.5 MeV 
will be counted 
•available in very large sizes, if required 
•possible discrimination against β-particles 
•easy window repair 
•consistent operating potential 
•not influenced by magnetic fields 
•extremely fragile 
•the uniformity of the larger detectors can be 
poor, with a low response to activity in the 
detector corners 
•can be sensitive to γ and neutrons 
•pulse pile-up effect at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 
except the ones with high dose rates or under 
liquid immersion conditions 
•considering only smooth and impermeable 
surfaces without corrosive chemical compounds  
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Table 6 
Strengths and weaknesses of the common detectors used for surface contamination measurements, in the case of β-particles, as well as their recommended applications 
in nuclear facilities subject to a D&D programme.  
DETECTOR TYPE STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES WHERE TO APPLY 
Scintillation detectors •available in a wide range of sizes 
•good sensitivity 
•can cover a wide range of energies 
•window easily replaced 
•lightweight 
•easy setting up procedure 
•susceptible to magnetic interference, 
unless using a proper Mu-metal shielding 
•fragile 
•can be sensitive to γ and neutrons 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as intrinsic 
defects and/or failures at intense 
radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment except 
the ones with magnetic interference or under liquid 
immersion conditions 
•considering only smooth and impermeable surfaces 
Thin end-window gas-filled 
proportional counters 
•a very good detection efficiency down 
to 14C (i.e., β-particles with Emax ≥ 156 
keV) 
•available in very large sizes, if required 
•easy window repair 
•consistent operating potential 
•not influenced by magnetic fields 
•good α rejection 
•very variable operating potential within 
any one type 
•fragile 
•can be sensitive to γ and neutrons 
•pulse pile-up effect at intense radiation 
fields 
•almost nuclear facility areas and equipment except the 
ones with high dose rates or under liquid immersion 
conditions 
•considering only smooth and impermeable surfaces 
without corrosive chemical compounds 
Thin titanium window xenon- 
filled sealed proportional 
counters 
•useful for β and low energy X/γ 
radiation 
•relatively tough window 
•lightweight 
•no gas filling required 
•consistent operating potential and 
radiation characteristics 
•require high voltage 
•uniformity of larger detectors can be 
poor 
•can be sensitive to γ and neutrons 
•pulse pile-up effect at intense radiation 
fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment except 
the ones with high dose rates or under liquid immersion 
conditions 
•considering only smooth and impermeable surfaces 
without corrosive chemical compounds 
Thin end-window GM detectors •large, easily processed pulse 
•very simple setting up procedure 
•consistent operating voltage and 
radiation characteristics 
•lowest cost overall option in most 
circumstances 
•light and compact 
•small “pancake” GMs are reasonably 
cheap 
•no alpha discrimination unless in ‘dual 
phosphor probe’ form 
•fragile 
•can be sensitive to γ and neutrons 
•dead time effect at intense radiation 
fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment except 
the ones with high dose rates or under liquid immersion 
conditions 
•considering only smooth and impermeable surfaces 
without corrosive chemical compounds 
Thin walled GM detectors •more robust than the thin window 
variety 
•larger useful area than the thin 
window variety 
•very simple setting up procedure 





•not appropriate for low-energy 
β-particles (Emax < 0.5 MeV) 
•require regular refreshing with counting 
gas 
•can be sensitive to γ and neutrons 
•dead time effect at intense radiation 
fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment except 
the ones with high dose rates or under liquid immersion 
conditions 
•considering only smooth and impermeable surfaces 
without corrosive chemical compounds  
Table 7 
Strengths and weaknesses of the common detectors used for surface contamination measurements, in the case of X/γ radiation, as well as their recommended ap-
plications in nuclear facilities subject to a D&D programme.  





•small crystal size is a very efficient X/γ 
radiation, for the 3 mm thickness the detection 
probability is greater than 0.5 for normal 
incident radiation up to 120 keV 
•a typical aluminium window of 14 mg cm-2 
thick has a transmission of at least 0.8 for 
normal incident X/γ radiation down to 10 keV 
•for a beryllium window of 46 mg cm-2 thick, 
the transmission at normal incidence is at least 
0.8 down to 5 keV 
•the combination of the proper scintillator and 
window thus offers a very efficient detector 
over a wide energy range 
•the scintillator is very brittle and easily crazes 
with mechanical shock 
•can be sensitive to neutrons 
•pulse pile-up effect at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and 
equipment except the ones with high dose 
rates, excessive room temperature variations or 
under liquid immersion conditions 





•useful for β and low energy X/γ radiation 
•relatively tough window 
•lightweight 
•no gas filling required 
•consistent operating potential and radiation 
characteristics 
•end-window can be physically damaged, which if 
not carefully repaired will lead to a gradual 
deterioration of the scintillator, resulting in an 
increase in the energy threshold 
•can be sensitive to neutrons 
•pulse pile-up effect at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and 
equipment except the ones with high dose rates 
or under liquid immersion conditions 
•considering only smooth and impermeable 
surfaces without corrosive chemical 
compounds  
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classified as conventional waste. 
4.2.1.2. Contamination. Surface contamination measurements need to 
be as close as possible (no more than a few mm) to the object under 
examination and special care must be taken to not contaminate the 
detector itself. In addition, because of the extremely low penetration of 
alpha particles, an ultra-thin barrier must be considered to allow the 
particles to enter the active region of the detector, while simultaneously 
protecting this latter. Most times, a detector with an end-window, made 
of an aluminized Mylar or mica film (~0.8 mg/cm2), is used and thus 
any eventual contact with hard objects may puncture it. 
4.2.2. Materials 
4.2.2.1. Air. Almost the same as for environmental radiation mea-
surements (see Section 4.1.2.1). 
4.2.2.2. Liquid. Such a constraint is not applicable for surface 
contamination measurements. 
4.2.2.3. Consistency. When a radioactive substance has been able to 
fully infiltrate, somehow or other, inside porous materials or the ones 
with structural cracks, like in a concrete wall, its surface contamination 
measurements are no longer valid. They should in consequence be 
restricted, especially in the case of α-particles, to only smooth and 
impermeable surfaces. 
4.2.3. Accessibility 
4.2.3.1. Narrow and/or clutter spaces. The possible deployment of a 
remotely and well-equipped robot (a drone cannot be used for the same 
reasons explained in Section 4.2.1.1), preferably under wireless mode, 
could be envisaged to control the extent of surface contamination in 
difficult access rooms. 
4.2.3.2. Height. Same recommendation as in Section 4.1.3.2 but not 
considering the drone option (see explanation in Section 4.2.1.1). 
4.2.3.3. Subsurface. Such a constraint is not applicable for surface 
contamination measurements. 
4.2.4. Other hazards. Same recommendation as in Section 4.1.4 but not 
considering the drone option (see explanation in Section 4.2.1.1). 
4.3. Gamma-ray spectrometry 
Table 8 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the common 
γ-spectrometry detectors as well as their recommended applications in 
nuclear facilities subject to a D&D programme. There are obviously 
many other detectors of the same families (i.e., inorganic scintillators 
and semiconductors) but their behaviour does not differ a lot from those 
already mentioned in this table. 
4.3.1. Radioactivity constraints 
4.3.1.1. Radiation 
4.3.1.1.1. Identification of constraints. When a given gamma-ray 
spectrometer is exposed to intense radiation fields dead time and 
pulse pile-up effects may occur (Usman and Patil, 2018). Several hard-
ware and software methods are available to reduce or to correct these 
effects in certain circumstances, but they shall be considered in advance 
when undertaking the suitable selection of detection systems. Some 
detectors have very low associated dead time, like organic scintillators 
(Knoll, 2010; Tsoulfanidis and Landsberger, 2015). 
In addition, exposure to extremely high flux of neutrons charged 
particles and very energetic photons (i.e. above 10 MeV) may cause 
several intrinsic defects and/or failures (lattice displacements, deep- 
level traps, glitches, parasitic structures, single events, etc.) in both 
inorganic scintillators and semiconductors and associated electronics 
therefore affecting their detection properties. 
Another key issue already highlighted by Aspe et al. (2020), refers to 
the background correction problem liable to be altered at high dose 
rates, thus implying an increase in counts under the total absorption 
peaks corresponding to the radionuclides of interest. More interference 
phenomena can also arise as a result of the interaction of primary X- or 
γ-rays with the structural and shielding materials around the detector, 
through processes like Compton back-scattering, Bremsstrahlung radi-
ation, secondary annihilation 511 keV photons after electron-positron 
pair production and characteristic X-rays issued from the photoelectric 
effect. They are expected to increase with the active volume of the de-
tector and, depending on the energy resolution of this latter, they can 
prevent the appearance of some less intense peaks of the analysed 
radionuclide source. In some cases, the presence of high flux neutrons 
may activate the detector material, eventually emitting new X- or γ-rays 
that can once again interfere with the measured spectrum (Baginova 
et al., 2018). 
4.3.1.1.2. Integration of constraints on the instrument design. Dedi-
cated digital signal processing equipment and algorithms can be used to 
automatically correct, even partially in some extreme situations, both 
the dead time and pulse pile-up effects (Stranneby and Walker, 2004). 
Whereas most of the above intrinsic failures can be prevented by 
using radiation-tolerant and redundant integrated circuits (Calligaro 
and Gatti, 2018), some of the crystal defects like lattice displacements 
can be repaired after the measurement through the so-called annealing 
process (Peplowski et al., 2019). That is a kind of “reset” during which 
the detector needs to be heated at a temperature around 100 ◦C for some 
time (normally several days) and left afterwards as long as necessary for 
correction of such defects. 
4.3.1.1.3. Integration of constraints on the final mechanical design. 
The possibility of using low-noise charge preamplifier (Pullia et al., 
2005) allowing the remote control from large distances of the detector 
with adequate shielding and collimation cannot be excluded. 
Furthermore, as already stated before for other measuring equip-
ment, the complementary deployment of a remotely mobile platform, 
with increased radiation tolerance of both its mechanical and electronic 
components, is also a good alternative. 
4.3.1.2. Contamination. All preventive actions need to be taken when 
there is a minimal possibility of radioactive contamination of the de-
tector. For this reason, only those measurement instruments not using an 
internal fan mechanism to cool down their unit head have to be fav-
oured. For practical considerations, even the use of liquid nitrogen, CFC, 
or any other refrigerant (flammable or not) must be strictly forbidden. 
For example, an HPGe detector coupled to a pulse-tube cryocooler can 
be considered as the only choice among the refrigeration possibilities. 
Additional protection solution is achieved through confinement of both 
the detector and its electronics within plastic bags. However, as already 
stated in Section 4.1.1.2, this way of protecting from contamination can 
be counterproductive as it may either block their internal heat exhaust 
or produce more attenuation phenomenon of low-energy X- and γ-rays. 
This is the case for scintillation detectors, leading to problems related to 
an adequate energy and FWHM calibration (Ahmed, 2007). 
4.3.2. Materials 
4.3.2.1. Air. Inorganic crystal detectors may show a gain drift due to 
temperature variations. In fact, they are usually coupled to a photo-
multiplier tube, which is highly sensitive to temperature changes, as 
well as to stray magnetic fields. Although, when using rather a silicon 
avalanche photodiode, this latter is also prevented in operations at 
elevated temperatures (Knoll, 2010). 
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Conversely, HPGe semiconductors are in essence unaffected by 
changes in ambient temperature or magnetic field but not their associ-
ated electronics. This can lead to large uncertainties or misinterpretation 
of the measured gamma-ray spectrum. When it is possible, one of the 
solutions consists in performing measurements in a constant tempera-
ture environment (for example, if the temperature varies throughout the 
day, measurements can be done only every morning), or pay special 
attention to in-situ calibration. As a last resort, a temperature compen-
sation system, based on stabilization schemes, can also be implemented. 
See the commentary of Section 4.1.2.1 related to conventional cables 
and BNC connectors. 
4.3.2.2. Liquid. Immersive or high humidity measurement is very 
challenging and needs particular technologies and means of interven-
tion. Most often, technologies when this constraint is of particular 
relevance, consist of developing special mechanical equipment to pro-
tect a standard detector, with particular attention to the interface and 
electrical connection. 
The presence of liquids can alter some detector performances in 
different ways. Some inorganic crystal detectors (see Table 8) are hy-
groscopic, which means they can be easily damaged when directly 
exposed to moisture in air at normal humidity levels. Therefore, the 
hermetic seals used in these types of detectors must be protected at all 
times. Similarly, it is strongly advisable to handle them with care and 
avoid mechanical shocks that may crack or chip the seals. Because hy-
dration adopts some colour, it is an excellent absorber of photons in the 
Table 8 
Strengths and weaknesses of the common γ-spectrometry detectors as well as their recommended applications in nuclear facilities subject to a D&D programme.  
DETECTOR 
TYPE 
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES WHERE TO APPLY 
NaI(Tl) detectors •widely used 
•the detection efficiency of a 3” × 3′′ NaI(Tl) crystal 
was historically taken as the reference to compare 
that of the other γ-spectrometers 
•available in many sizes 
•do not require reinforced cooling 
•poor energy resolution (~7% @ 
662 keV) 
•possible gain drift due to 
temperature variations 
•hygroscopic material (must be fully 
sealed) 
•sensitive to neutrons 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as 
intrinsic defects and/or failures at 
intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment except the ones 
with high dose rates, excessive room temperature variations, or 




•better detection efficiency than NaI(Tl) 
•non-hygroscopic material 
•hard and rugged 
•poor energy resolution (~10% @ 
662 keV) 
•possible gain drift due to 
temperature variations 
•unsuitable at elevated temperatures 
(>50 ◦C) 
•sensitive to neutrons 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as 
intrinsic defects and/or failures at 
intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment except the ones 
with high dose rates or room temperature variations 
LaBr3(Ce) 
detectors 
•slightly better detection efficiency than NaI(Tl) 
•moderate energy resolution (~3% @ 662 keV) 
•do not require reinforced cooling 
•possible gain drift due to 
temperature variations 
•hygroscopic material (must be fully 
sealed) 
•sensitive to neutrons 
•intrinsic background due to the 
presence of 138La and 227Ac 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as 
intrinsic defects and/or failures at 
intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment except the ones 
with high dose rates, excessive room temperature variations, or 
under liquid immersion conditions 
CeBr3 detectors •slightly better detection efficiency than NaI(Tl) 
•moderate energy resolution (~4% @ 662 keV) 
•very low intrinsic background 
•do not require reinforced cooling 
•possible gain drift due to 
temperature variations 
•hygroscopic material (must be fully 
sealed) 
•sensitive to neutrons 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as 
intrinsic defects and/or failures at 
intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment except the ones 
with high dose rates, excessive room temperature variations, or 
under liquid immersion conditions 
CZT detectors •moderate energy resolution(~2.5% @ 662 keV) 
•do not require reinforced cooling 
•tolerate temperature variations 
•low cost 
•low detection efficiency 
•sensitive to neutrons 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as 
intrinsic defects and/or failures at 
intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment, especially, 
when small sizes are required. 
CdTe detectors •good energy resolution (~0.6% @ 662 keV) 
•allow ultra-thin designs 
•do not require reinforced cooling 
•tolerate temperature variations 
•can use polarising batteries 
•low detection efficiency 
•sensitive to neutrons 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as 
intrinsic defects and/or failures at 
intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment, especially, 
when small sizes are required. 
HPGe detectors •excellent energy resolution (~0.15% @ 662 keV) 
•adapted to multiple γ-ray emitting radionuclides 
•low detection efficiency 
•need a vacuum enclosure and 
cooling to cryogenic temperature 
(<80 K) 
•very expensive 
•sensitive to neutrons 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as 
intrinsic defects and/or failures at 
intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment except the ones 
with narrow spaces, high dose rates, excessive room 
temperature variations, or under liquid immersion conditions  
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visible domain and can significantly degrade the scintillation light 
output and thereby the detection performance. 
Most fluids attenuate particles, so that interpretation of immersive 
measurement is also challenging and requires more precision in the 
measurement position. As already stated in the contamination subsec-
tion, particle attenuation leads to problems related to an adequate ef-
ficiency calibration that must be considered. 
4.3.2.3. Consistency. Same recommendations as for environmental ra-
diation measurements (see Section 4.1.2.3). 
4.3.3. Accessibility constraints 
4.3.3.1. Narrow and/or clutter spaces. Same recommendations as for 
environmental radiation measurements (see Section 4.1.3.1), without 
excluding the possibility of also considering CdTe or CZT semi-
conductors as they are available in very small sizes. 
4.3.3.2. Height. Same recommendations as for environmental radiation 
measurements (see Section 4.1.3.2) and the only limitation would be the 
heavy shielding that must be implemented with the detector. 
4.3.3.3. Subsurface. Section 4.1.3.3 explains the benefits of carrying 
out preliminary environmental measurements throughout deeply 
contaminated areas or soils from a qualitative point of view. Hence, they 
must always be complemented by means of γ-spectrometry in order to be 
able to identify the potential presence of the major gamma-ray emitting 
radionuclides and to quantify their activity by assuming, as a first 
approximation, uniform depth distribution up to a certain limit. For 
more details on this aspect, it will be necessary to plan many repre-
sentative core samples and to send them for further analysis in the 
laboratory. 
Although widely used, both scintillation detectors and HPGe de-
tectors are somewhat fragile for in-situ measurement in subsurface. For 
this reason, as CdTe or CZT semiconductors are available in very small 
sizes, they can be very useful for down-hole logging operations despite 
their lower energy resolution compared to HPGe detectors (see Table 8). 
More rugged scintillation detectors using silicon avalanche photodiode 
instead of conventional photomultiplier tubes are also advisable, albeit 
with some limitations that are currently encountered with the small 
sizes of detectors. Notwithstanding, this kind of measurements cannot 
be carried out when the soil is laden with rocks and boulders that may 
cause serious damages to the detector used. 
4.3.4. Other hazards 
Same recommendations as for environmental radiation measure-
ments (see Section 4.1.4). 
4.4. Neutron measurements 
At the risk of being repetitive and as any of the available radiation 
detectors can be easily adapted on a practical level, with the addition of 
an appropriate converter material, to measure neutrons, almost all the 
particular dispositions discussed above (namely those in Section 4.1) are 
also valid here. 
Table 9 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the common 
neutron detectors as well as their recommended applications in nuclear 
facilities subject to a D&D programme. 
4.4.1. Radioactivity constraints 
4.4.1.1. Radiation 
4.4.1.1.1. Identification of constraints. As stated in Aspe et al. (2020), 
particular attention is given to the intrinsic response of the neutron 
detectors to X/γ radiation. Such response is typified as Gamma Rejection 
Ratio (GRR) when no neutron source is present and or Gamma Absolute 
Rejection Ratio in the presence of neutrons (GARRn). Both of them can 
be corrected on the basis of pulse shape discrimination or PSD. Indeed at 
high dose-rates, peak amplitudes from gamma rays become considerably 
larger than any individual neutron pulse, due to pulse pile-up effect, 
distorting in this manner the above rejection ratios (Knoll, 2010; Kouzes 
et al., 2010). 
Molecular disassociation could also be caused when using 10BF3 
detectors at very elevated radiation levels. This can alter the pulse height 
spectra coming from neutron-induced events. In some extreme cases, 
inner chemical changes can cause permanent damage to most detectors 
(Knoll, 2010). 
4.4.1.1.2. Integration of constraints on the instrument design. Practi-
cally all the challenges that can be encountered in very intense radiation 
fields can be easily addressed by means of fairly thin metallic activation 
foils (Son and Nguyen, 2018). Their associated neutron-induced radio-
activity can be measured with a conventional instrument, once recov-
ered back in a safer room. 
Another possible solution is the one based on self-powered neutron 
detectors or SPNDs, which are usually used for in-core monitoring. They 
have a highly compact coaxial structure consisting of a central metallic 
electrode (leading mostly to short-lived β-emissions after neutron acti-
vation) surrounded by a mineral insulator and enclosed in a metallic 
sheath. Such a configuration provides a net current that is proportional 
to the incident neutron flux and can be measured externally (Giot et al., 
2017). 
4.4.1.1.3. Integration of constraints on the final mechanical design. 
Same recommendations as for environmental radiation measurements 
(see Section 4.1.1.1.3). 
4.4.1.2. Contamination. Much of the recommendations given in sec-
tions 4.1.1.2 and 4.3.1.2 are also valid here. 
4.4.2. Materials 
4.4.2.1. Air. Neutron measurements based on activation metallic foils 
or on SPNDs offer a good stability under variable air temperature and 
pressure conditions. 
See the commentary of Section 4.1.2.1 related to conventional cables 
and BNC connectors. 
4.4.2.2. Liquid. See Section 4.1.2.2 regarding the appearance of 
spurious pulses under high humidity environments. 
4.4.2.3. Consistency. Same recommendations as for environmental ra-
diation measurements (see Section 4.1.2.3). 
4.4.3. Accessibility 
4.4.3.1. Narrow and/or clutter spaces. Same recommendations as for 
environmental radiation measurements (see Section 4.1.3.1), except in 
the coincidence neutron counting mode since the associated instrument 
is a bit bulky and heavy. 
4.4.3.2. Height. Same recommendations as for environmental radiation 
measurements (see Section 4.1.3.2) except in the coincidence neutron 
counting mode since the associated instrument is a bit bulky and heavy. 
4.4.3.3. Subsurface. Coincidence neutron courting could be foreseen as 
often as possible to improve the knowledge gained about the subsurface 
source term from environmental radiation measurements (see Section 
4.1.3.3), γ-spectrometry and laboratory analysis of representative core 
samples (see Section 4.3.3.3). Otherwise, total neutron counting may 
also be of great utility. 
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4.4.4. Other hazards 
Same recommendations as for environmental radiation measure-
ments (see Section 4.1.4). 
4.5. Radiation cameras 
This section only deals with the gamma camera as the alpha and 
neutron ones are neither mature nor widely industrialized technologies. 
In addition, to the best of our knowledge, there is not enough infor-
mation to get the necessary recommendations regarding their applica-
tion in nuclear facilities subject to a D&D programme. 
Accordingly, Table 10 summarizes the known strengths and weak-
nesses of the different γ-camera types as well as their recommended 
applications under such circumstances. 
4.5.1. Radioactivity constraints 
4.5.1.1. Radiation. High radiation levels may also affect the perfor-
mance of electronic components of the cameras. Such an effect has 
largely been discussed in Aspe et al. (2020), so there is no need to 
reproduce all the content of this publication here. However, some other 
features could be explained like those aspects related to the accumula-
tion of charge carriers (i.e., free electrons and holes) within integrated 
circuits, with a direct influence on the underlying electric fields and then 
on the electrical properties of silicon sensors. For example, the CCD 
charge transfer becomes inefficient and the device quickly stops work-
ing, whereas the threshold voltage of a CMOS transistor shifts slowly, 
until the device is always on or fully closed. Digital circuits, similar to 
some analog ones, can tolerate moderate amounts of threshold voltage 
changes, allowing them to continue operating normally until the device 
definitely breaks down (Hopkinson and Mohammadzadeh, 2004). 
Table 9 
Strengths and weaknesses of the common neutrons detectors as well as their recommended applications in nuclear facilities subject to a D&D programme.  
DETECTOR TYPE STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES WHERE TO APPLY 
3He gas-filled proportional 
counters 
•reasonably light 
•good neutron cross-section 
•varied filling pressure 
•inert and non-toxic gas 




•reduced γ rejection 
•sensitive to vibrations 
•pulse pile-up effect at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 
10BF3 gas-filled proportional 
counters 
•reasonably light 
•good γ rejection 
•readily available than 3He 
•low neutron cross-section 
•toxic and corrosive 
•sensitive to vibrations 
•limited filling pressure 
•pulse pile-up effect and gas degradation at 
intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment except the 




•good γ rejection 
•readily available than 3He 
•can be filled with non-toxic gas 
(90% Ar + 10% CO2) 
•resistant to intense radiation 
fields 
•low neutron cross-section 
•limited10B coating thickness (only a few μm) 
•sensitive to vibrations 
•pulse pile-up effect at intense radiation fields 




•good detection efficiency* 
•insensitive to vibrations 
•poor γ rejection 
•availability and cost of enriched 6Li 
•hygroscopic material (must be fully sealed) 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as intrinsic defects 
and/or failures at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment except the 





•good detection efficiency* 
•can discriminate γ signals 
•insensitive to vibrations 
•poor light transmittance 
•availability and cost of enriched 6Li 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as intrinsic defects 
and/or failures at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment except the 




•good detection efficiency* 
•can discriminate γ signals 
•spectroscopic capability 
•insensitive to vibrations 
•availability and cost of enriched 6Li 
•hygroscopic material (must be fully sealed) 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as intrinsic defects 
and/or failures at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment except the 




•good detection efficiency* 
•can discriminate γ signals 
•spectroscopic capability 
•insensitive to vibrations 
•availability and cost of enriched 6Li 
•hygroscopic material (must be fully sealed) 
•intrinsic background due to the presence of 
138La and 227Ac 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as intrinsic defects 
and/or failures at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment except the 




•huge neutron cross-section 
•no need for isotope enriching 
•non-hygroscopic material 
•high radiation hardness (up to 
107 Gy) 
•poor γ rejection but less pronounced for thin 
detectors 
•very fragile (cleaving and cracking issues) 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 
6Li glass fibers doped with Ce •flexible design 
•good detection efficiency* 
•chemical inert material 
•tolerate high temperatures 
•high count rates 
•insensitive to vibrations 
•poor γ rejection 
•availability and cost of enriched 6Li 
•may contain naturally occurring 
radionuclides (at best < 3.33 × 10− 3 Bq/g) 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 
*The high atomic density of 6Li in the sensitive material fully compensates for its very low cross-section. 
K. Amgarou et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Progress in Nuclear Energy 137 (2021) 103761
13
4.5.1.2. Contamination. Almost the same as for γ-spectrometry (see 
Section 4.3.1.2). 
4.5.2. Materials constraints 
4.5.2.1. Air. See the commentary of Section 4.1.2.1 related to con-
ventional cables and BNC connectors. 
4.5.2.2. Liquid. Almost the same as for γ-spectrometry (see Section 
4.3.2.2). 
4.5.2.3. Consistency. Same recommendations as for environmental ra-
diation measurements (see Section 4.1.2.3). 
4.5.3. Accessibility constraints 
4.5.3.1. Narrow and/or clutter spaces. Same recommendations as for 
environmental radiation measurements (see Section 4.1.3.1). 
4.5.3.2. Height. Same recommendation as for environmental radiation 
measurements (see Section 4.1.3.2). 
4.5.3.3. Subsurface. Same recommendations as for environmental ra-
diation measurements (see Section 4.1.3.3). 
4.5.4. Other hazards 
Same recommendations as for environmental radiation measure-
ments (see Section 4.1.4). 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyses the appropriate in-situ measurement techniques 
to be used when different kind of constrained environments are present 
at sites under D&D processes and serves as a global guidance to assist 
with the decision making process. It also provides some particular dis-
positions, for the appropriate implementation of the chosen instruments. 
As a first step in this guidance, the recommended in-situ measure-
ment technique in each of the three phases of a D&D programme is 
established as a function of the needs, objective of the investigation and 
type of radioactivity present at the phase of a D&D programme. The 
second and most important analysis done is the level of impact of the 
different environmental constraints on each in-situ measurement 
technique. 
The analysis performed in this paper shows that most of the existing 
constraints impacting the in-situ measurements carried out under the 
D&D programmes for nuclear facilities have a solution or have been 
already considered for the product/system developers, and thus there is 
a way to deal with them. 
The most conventional and classical determinations, such as envi-
ronmental radiation measurements and surface contamination ones, are 
those for which constraints are more integrated in the system definition. 
Different solutions for the instrument design, as also in the field of its 
mechanical integration, have been developed over the years in which 
D&D activities have become increasingly common. Several types of gas- 
filled detectors and the newly developed plastic scintillators, with 
different configurations, are normally used for environmental mea-
surements. From gas-filled detectors to scintillators or solid state de-
tectors, also with multiple configurations, can all be applied, depending 
on constraints and contamination types, for surface contamination 
measurements. 
In the case of gamma-ray spectrometry, a wide range of detectors and 
technical solutions already exists to allow the integration of the different 
constrains in the system definition. However, there is a great limitation 
for the HPGe detector, although being the reference one due to its high 
energy resolution, as it needs to be cooled to cryogenic temperatures. 
One must not forget the drawback, associated with its restricted appli-
cation to limited accessibility areas. In addition, due to the current big 
gap between the HPGe energy resolution and those of the other γ-ray 
spectrometers that can properly work in environmental conditions, 
there is still a real challenge for on-going R&D activities, not only in 
detector development domain, but also in those related to the me-
chanical integration, latest generation electronics and advanced spectral 
analysis. Dedicated digital signal processing equipment and algorithms 
can be provided to automatically correct signal distortion produced by 
intense radiation fields, alongside the use of low-noise charge pream-
plifier with adequate shielding and collimation. 
Neutron measurements are not as common in the D&D programme 
activities. Actually, they are limited to certain zones and situations. 
However, most of the constraints are well integrated in the system 
definition and solutions for the instrument design, as well as for its 
mechanical integration, are available for users. The well-known gas- 
filled proportional counters (3He or 10BF3) are usually used but alter-
native scintillation materials with neutron converters can also be 
applied. 
Regarding the radiation camera, only the gamma ones have been 
taken into account in this document, as those able to locate alpha and 
neutron sources are neither mature nor widely industrialized technolo-
gies. In this case, we are talking about compact systems, commercially 
available, designed to provide a specific solution; the selection of one or 
Table 10 
Strengths and weaknesses of the different γ-camera types as well as their recommended applications in nuclear facilities subject to a D&D programme.  
CAMERA 
TYPE 
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES WHERE TO APPLY 
Pinhole •optimal angular resolution (1.9◦–6.7◦) 
•wide γ-energy range, from 241Am to 60Co 
•good dose-rate linearity 
•enhanced signal-to-noise ratio 
•heavy (≥15 kg) 
•low sensitivity 
•small field-of-view (30◦ or 50◦) 
•moderate energy resolution 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as intrinsic defects and/or 
failures at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 
except the ones with narrow spaces 
Coded 
aperture 
•can be ultra-compact (<300 g) 
•high sensitivity 
•optimal angular resolution (2.5◦–6◦) 
•wide γ-energy range, from 30 keV to 60Co 
•good dose-rate linearity 
•possibility of background subtraction under 
mask/anti-mask mode 
•small field-of-view (45◦–50◦) 
•moderate energy resolution 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as intrinsic defects and/or 
failures at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment 
Compton •can be compact (3–5 kg) 
•field-of-view up to 360◦
•high energy resolution 
•low sensitivity 
•moderate angular resolution (10◦–30◦) 
•hardly applicable below 250 keV 
•pulse pile-up effect as well as intrinsic defects and/or 
failures at intense radiation fields 
•almost all nuclear facility areas and equipment  
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other depends on the application itself and on the room where the 
measurement must be performed. The most important constraint, the 
radiation one, has almost the same impact on all types of the existing 
γ-cameras and has not been solved yet, neither in the design nor in its 
mechanical integration. 
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